Is there a cartesian renaissance of the mind or is it time for a new taxonomy for low responsive states?
The mass media have recently pointed out the likelihood of diagnostic errors in post-coma patients. Late recoveries of consciousness, even after 20 years, might indicate hidden misdiagnoses that are not corrected over a long period of time. The rate of misdiagnoses of patients in a vegetative state is very high when based on behavioral assessment strategies alone. An extremely restrictive motor repertoire, as occurs in locked-in patients, seems to be the major factor responsible for diagnostic confusion. Functional neuroimaging techniques are regarded as promising tools in unearthing covert awareness in behaviorally unresponsive patients who are unable to produce any motor output. However, unless we believe that these patients persistently live in an unconvincing Cartesian-like state, in which thinking and acting are mutually dissociated, we have to admit that a new taxonomy for low responsive states is called for. This taxonomy should take into account the possible syndromic overlap between disorders of consciousness and locked-in syndrome. We should suspect a "locked-in state" in behaviorally unresponsive patients unless we reach strong evidence that such is not the case; this is the only way to avoid dramatic misdiagnoses.